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Abstract 
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. 
In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: 
public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents’ behaviour more 
than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that it might be better to reduce 
the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows that public 
information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to 
all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative 
welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. 
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1 – Introduction 
There is a general presumption that higher central bank transparency in terms of information 
disclosure to a wider audience improves the effectiveness of monetary policy and is beneficial 
to markets as it reduces information asymmetries, helps to better assess risk and arrive at 
more informed decisions, thus enhancing market efficiency. While practitioners (in central 
banks and international institutions) agree on the desirability of informative announcements 
and promote higher transparency on the ground that any information is valuable to markets, 
recent academic literature distinguishes private and public information and argues that public 
announcements may destabilize markets and reduce efficiency by their effects on higher-order 
beliefs, if markets are characterized by positive externalities. Morris and Shin (2002) 
(henceforth M-S) have shown that noisy public announcements may be detrimental to welfare 
from an ex-ante point of view. They conclude that a commitment to withholding relevant 
information or deliberately reducing its precision may be welfare enhancing.  
In this paper we challenge this conclusion by distinguishing two components of 
transparency: precision of information and degree of publicity. The degree of publicity is the 
proportion of agents who receive a signal. Using a stylised coordination game introduced by 
M-S, we show that information should always be provided to the market with maximum 
precision, but, under certain conditions, the mechanisms of disseminating information should 
aim at limiting the degree of publicity by providing information only to some fraction of 
market participants. The optimal degree of publicity depends on the precision of 
announcements. If there are inevitable limits to the precision, the optimal degree of publicity 
is rising in precision and reaches one if precision is sufficiently high. The rationale for our 
results is that partial publicity increases expected utility for those, who receive the 
information, while potentially detrimental effects on higher-order beliefs are limited if agents 
expect that others do not possess the same information.  
The literature distinguishes at least three different lines of arguments against central bank 
transparency. Within a Barro-Gordon framework, the inflation bias may be affected either 
way by policy transparency. In addition, economic transparency may offset desired real 
effects of monetary policy. Geraats (2002) gives an excellent overview of the pros and cons of 
transparency with several examples of welfare reducing information in a Barro-Gordon 
framework. Faust and Svensson (2001) show that complete transparency – that is the 
observation of the central bank’s intentions and goals by the private sector – leads to the 
largest inflationary bias. Since private agents do not need to infer the preferences of the 
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central bank from its behaviour, the monetary authority bears no reputation costs if it pursues 
hidden objectives in addition to the inflation target. In a model with no inflationary bias and 
no trade-off between credibility and flexibility, Cukierman (2001) stresses that when the 
central bank tries to achieve two goals, limited transparency improves the expected social 
welfare. The central bank can use its private information to attain better values for these goals. 
Even from a practical point of view, too much transparency of monetary policy can be 
undesirable. Mishkin (2004) shows that transparency can go too far in complicating the 
communication process and perturbing central banks’ main objectives. Following Winkler 
(2000), the main drawback of this strand of literature is to underestimate the impact of 
informational policy on higher-order beliefs.  
The discussion about the distinct effects of public and private information started with the 
application of the theory of global games to speculative attacks by Morris and Shin (1998, 
1999). A speculative-attack game has a unique equilibrium if private information is 
sufficiently precise in relation to public information (Hellwig, 2002a). Heinemann and Illing 
(2002), Metz (2002) and Bannier and Heinemann (2005) analyse how the ex-ante probability 
of currency crises is affected by the relative precision of public and private information. To 
the extent that financial markets exhibit strategic complementarities, common knowledge 
amplifies the impact of new information and provokes runs into or out of a market, because of 
higher-order beliefs. Precise public announcements may induce self-fulfilling beliefs and 
trigger a crisis. Heinemann and Illing (2002) conclude that the central bank should provide 
information to agents in private with small idiosyncratic noise.  
M-S present a stylised coordination game with a unique equilibrium in which public 
information may be detrimental to welfare if its precision is limited by inevitable forecast 
errors. Their model emphasizes the role of public information as a focal point for private 
actions. Strategic complementarities provide incentives to coordinate on the publicly 
announced state of the world and neglect private information. If public announcements are 
inaccurate, private actions are drawn away from the fundamental value. Public information is 
a double-edged instrument: it conveys valuable information, but the desire to coordinate leads 
agents to condition their actions stronger on public announcements than is optimal. Both 
effects get stronger if the precision of public information rises. The welfare effect of precision 
is U-shaped and an infinite precision of public information maximizes welfare. However, if its 
precision has an upper limit, it may be better not to provide any public information at all than 
disseminating information with maximum precision. M-S conclude that a welfare maximizing 
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information provider might want to reduce the precision of public signals or avoid them 
entirely.  
Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) interpret the model by M-S as a Lucas’ islands economy. 
Building up on this interpretation, Amato and Shin (2006) argue that over-reactions of prices 
to public announcements raise doubts on the relevance of prices as indicators of economic 
balances. Morris and Shin (2005) argue that when the central bank conveys its own view 
clearly, the market’s expectations will be closer to the central bank’s own expectations instead 
of correcting eventual faults of the central bank, and market prices will be informationally 
inefficient. Hellwig (2002b) shows that a higher degree of transparency – meaning a higher 
degree of common knowledge – reduces the efficiency of monetary policy.  
Angeletos and Pavan (2004) and Hellwig (2005) challenge the conclusions of M-S. 
Considering economies with increasing returns to scale (Angeletos and Pavan) or 
monopolistic competition (Hellwig), they find that the precision of public information is 
always welfare increasing. The reason for this is a different notion of individual utility. In M-
S, the payoff of a player decreases with the distance between his own action and the action of 
others, but this distance is irrelevant from a social perspective. As Angeletos and Pavan 
(2004, p.3) put it: “more transparent public information facilitates more effective 
coordination, which is valued by the market but not by the society”. Instead, they consider 
environments in which there is complementarity at the social level so that coordination is 
socially valuable. However, financial markets are better characterized by coordination games, 
in which it is socially desirable to avoid any form of overreaction, so that it is always better to 
evaluate an asset in terms of the fundamental state of the economy rather than the beliefs of 
market participants.  
In a comment, Svensson (2005) suggests that M-S make in fact a good case in favour of 
transparency. The numerical condition under which an increasing transparency reduces 
welfare requires that the maximum precision of public information is smaller than the 
precision of private information, which seems unreasonable, given recent evaluations of 
public versus private-sector forecasts on GNP growth or inflation (Romer and Romer, 2000).1 
However, Morris, Shin and Tong (2005) show that if private and public signals are correlated, 
the potentially welfare reducing effects of public information occur even if public information 
is more precise than private signals. 
                                                 
1 See also Woodford (2005) for a discussion on this issue. 
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In analysing the effects of public announcements, most of the literature has concentrated 
on the optimal precision of public information, generally yielding “bang-bang solutions”, 
where public information should either be as precise as possible or be avoided entirely. 
Revisiting the beauty-contest framework of M-S, this paper explores a new dimension of 
information dissemination: the degree of publicity, by which we mean the proportion of 
economic agents who receive a message. While all of the previous papers distinguish two 
extreme kinds of signals, messages that are received by single agents only (private 
information) and messages that are common knowledge to all agents (public information), in 
the present paper, we allow for intermediate degrees of publicity: messages that are common 
knowledge to only a fraction of all agents. It turns out that such an intermediate degree of 
publicity is optimal if the maximum precision of information is sufficiently small.  
In situations where public information may be detrimental by coordinating agents’ 
activities away from social optimum, a message of high precision but limited publicity is 
superior to pure public information with low precision: for those who receive the signal, a 
high precision of information about underlying fundamentals enhances efficiency of private 
decisions. A low level of publicity, however, reduces incentives to over-react to this signal 
and limits the welfare reducing effect on higher-order beliefs: it combines the positive effects 
of valuable information for those who get it with a confinement of its threats by limiting the 
number of receivers. Hence, we show that it may be optimal to provide information with an 
interior degree of publicity either by informing only predetermined agents or by informing 
agents at random with a probability below one. This partially public information should 
always be provided with maximum feasible precision.  
The central bank has two different tools for conducting informational policy: the precision 
of information and the level of information dissemination (also called degree of publicity). 
Both instruments are double-edged: higher precision improves the quality of private decisions 
by those who receive information and higher publicity enlarges the number of those who 
benefit from information. At the same time, both instruments raise incentives to overweigh 
public signals. Our main result shows that a restriction to the number of people receiving 
public signals is a more efficient tool for avoiding precarious coordination effects than the 
ambiguity of signals is.   
Our results imply that it may be more efficient to disseminate information in communities 
or through media that reach only a part of all traders. Partially public announcements can also 
occur when central bankers deliver speeches or invite a small group of journalists (Walsh, 
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2005). Announcements in such environments are less widely reported than formal 
announcements or require more time to penetrate the whole community. Slow penetration 
prevents that these announcements become common knowledge at any point in time although 
the propagation of information may raise the degree of publicity above the primary proportion 
of informed traders. Optimal information policy must account for this multiplier effect. 
Thereby, our results give a rationale for the common practice of central banks to release 
partially public information in addition to official publications: information with low 
precision should be partially withheld from the public. Information of high precision should 
always be released with full publicity. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
solves for the unique equilibrium and establishes the position of the model by M-S as a 
particular case of our framework. Section 4 gives the welfare analysis. Section 5 discusses 
means by which the central bank can achieve partial publicity and whether private agents 
might counteract the central bank’s intentions and further disseminate its announcements. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 – The Model  
Our framework is based on M-S who describe a reminiscence of Keynes’ “beauty contest” 
example. Whereas they assume that public announcements are received by all agents and the 
information provider can choose the precision of public signals, we enlarge the choice set of 
the information provider by adding a second dimension: the degree of publicity that we model 
by the fraction of agents who receive a signal. We allow for two schemes of providing 
information: public signals may be released to a predetermined group of agents or to each 
agent with some probability. The first interpretation accounts for the possibility of central 
banks to spread news in certain communities or in a language that is understood only by some 
agents. The second interpretation is more related to the practical difficulties in achieving 
common knowledge: public announcement may be spread through media, but each market 
participant acknowledges a certain medium only with some probability. These probabilities 
may differ for different media, so that a central bank can choose the degree of publicity by 
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selecting appropriate media for publication. Within our model, both schemes of information 
provision are equivalent.2 
2.1. A beauty contest framework 
The model is a principal-agent two-stage game in which the central bank (principal) 
determines the optimal precision and the degree of publicity that maximise welfare before 
speculators (agents) take their decision. There is a continuum of agents, indexed by the unit 
interval [0,1]. Agent i chooses an action ℜ∈ia , and we write a for the action profile over all 
agents. The payoff function for agent i is given as in M-S by 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2, 1i i iu a r a r L Lθ θ≡ − − − − − , 
where θ  is the fundamental state of the economy and r is a constant, such that 0 ≤  r ≤  1 and 
( )∫ −≡ 1
0
2 djaaL iji ,   ∫≡
1
0
djLL j . 
The utility function for individual i has two components. The first component is a standard 
quadratic loss in the distance between the underlying state θ and his action ai. The second 
component is the “beauty contest” term. The loss is increasing in the distance between i’s 
action and the average action of the whole population. The parameter r is the weight 
attributed to this strategic uncertainty: the higher r is, the higher is the external effect arising 
from the coordination motive of decision makers.  
However, this spillover effect is socially inefficient and disappears at the social level. 
Therefore, there may be a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal 
solution. Social welfare is defined as the (normalized) average of individual utilities, given by 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ −−=−≡
1
0
2
1
0
,
1
1, diadiau
r
aW ii θθθ . 
As a consequence, the social planner, who cares only about social welfare, seeks to keep 
all agents’ actions close to state θ .  
The payoff structure is a reminiscence of Keynes’ beauty contest. Speculators gain from 
predicting the average opinion better than others. The motive for predicting others’ actions 
                                                 
2 Sims (2003) and Reis (2004) consider firms that have limited capacities to process information or face costs of 
acquiring, absorbing and processing information. Our partial release of information might also be understood as 
all firms observing the announcement but only a fraction P actually incorporating the new information into their 
decision.  
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arises from a potential redistribution between speculators. Therefore, the “beauty contest”-
part of the payoff function describes a zero-sum game. Coordination affects individual 
payoffs but not social welfare.  
2.2. Structure of uncertainty and timing of the game 
Agents face uncertainty concerning θ. However, to decide on an action, they potentially 
receive two kinds of signals that deviate from θ by independent error terms with normal 
distributions. Each agent receives a private signal  
xi = θ + εi   with   εi ~N(0,1/β). 
Signals of distinct individuals are independent and the distribution of private signals is treated 
as exogenously given. Eventually, agents have access to a public signal  
y θ η= +    with   η ~ N(0,1/α). 
The public signal is given to each agent with some probability P. Since we have a 
continuum of identical agents, the fraction of agents who receive public information equals P 
almost certainly. Without loss of generality, we may assume that agents ],0[ Pi ∈  receive the 
public signal and agents ]1,(Pi ∈  must rely on their private signals only. The signal y is 
“public” in the sense that the actual realization of y is common knowledge among agents 
],0[ Pi ∈ . Parameters α and β are the precisions of public and private signals.  
The optimal action of agent i is given by the first order condition: 
( ) ( ) ( )arEEra iii +−= θ1  
where Ei ( . ) is the expectation operator of player i and ∫= 1
0
djaa j  is the average action in the 
population. The following expressions come straightforwardly: 
- The expected state for an agent who does not receive y but possesses his own private 
information is given by E(θ | xi) = xi and his expected average action is given by  
( ) ii xxaE = . 
- The expected state for an agent who receives y on top of his own private signal is 
( ) βα αβθ ++= yxxyE ii,  
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and we also have his expectation of the others’ signals,  
( ) ( ) βα αβθ ++== yxxyEyxxE iiij ,, . 
The game consists of two stages. First, the principal (central bank) chooses the level of 
public information disclosure P and its precision α in order to maximize expected welfare. 
Then, in the second stage, agents choose their actions ai maximizing expected utility. An 
equilibrium of the game consists of strategies for the central bank and for the continuum of 
speculators such that no player has an incentive to deviate. First, we solve the subgame of the 
second stage for a given combination of P and α.  
 
3 – Equilibrium  
Agents who do not receive the public signal choose ai = xi. For the normal distribution, all 
conditional expectations are linear combinations of available information. The first order 
condition shows that the optimal action is a linear function of conditional expectations. 
Thereby, the optimal strategy of any agent who receives the public signal y is a linear strategy 
of the form 
( )yxa jj γγ −+= 1 . 
A formal proof is given in Appendix A. The optimal weight γ  depends on an agent’s 
expectations about the behaviour of other players. Because the best response of any agent is 
unique, in equilibrium, all players choose the same γ . The conditional estimate of the average 
action across all agents is then given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )jj xEPyExEPaE −+−+= 11 γγ . 
For any agent i who receives both signals: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .11
,11
,11,,
βα
αβγγ
γγ
γγ
+
+−++−=
−++−=
−+−+=
yxPPyP
yxxEPPyP
yxxEPyyxxEPyxaE
i
ij
ijiji
 
Thus, agent i’s optimal action, for ],0[ Pi ∈ , is given by 
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( ) ( ) ( )yxEryxarEa iiiii ,1, θ−+=  
        ( )( )[ ] ( )[ ]βα
γβαγβ
+
−++−−= 111 rPyrPxi  . 
Comparing coefficients and solving for γ yields the equilibrium of the subgame, 
( )
( )rP
rP
−+
−=
1
1*
βα
βγ . 
In equilibrium, agents with public information choose  
( )
( ) ( )rPyrP
rPxa ii −++−+
−=
11
1
βα
α
βα
β . 
This implies 
( )[ ] ( )θγθγ PyPa −+−+= 11 , 
which gives, after some rearrangements 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )rP
Py
rP
rPPa −++−+
−+−=
11
11
βα
α
βα
βαθ . 
This equation shows that, in equilibrium, actions are distorted away from θ towards y. The 
distortion increases in the precision of public information, α , and in the proportion of agents 
receiving it, P: 
- when α → 0, 0→P  or ∞→β , then θ=a : when public information is extremely 
imprecise or given to almost nobody, or when private information is extremely 
precise, then public information loses its coordination role and is ignored. 
- when ∞→α  or 0→β , then ( ) yPPa +−= 1θ : when public information is 
extremely precise or private information extremely imprecise, those who receive 
public information will disregard private information and choose yai = . The others 
can only use private signals, which are distributed around θ . Hence, those without 
public information will choose an average action of θ . 
The model of M-S represents a special case of our framework in which P = 1 is 
exogenously fixed. Under such circumstances, it is certain that all agents receive a private and 
a public signal (y is thus common knowledge among all agents). Here, the unique equilibrium 
is given by 
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( )
( )r
xrya ii −+
−+=
1
1
βα
βα . 
The weight on public information clearly exceeds its weight in ( )yxE i ,|θ , which is only 
)/( βαα + . This mirrors the disproportionate impact of the public signal in coordinating 
agents’ actions. Since there is no other instrument, the only way to restrict the potential 
damaging effects of public information is a limitation of their precision. Our more general 
framework provides the central bank with a second instrument that may be superior in 
reducing the damages of public information. 
 
4 – Welfare implications  
Let us now turn to the first stage of the game and derive the optimal degree of publicity. Since 
this is our main innovation, we will first calculate the optimal degree of publicity P for 
precision α  being given exogenously, before we focus on the more general solution, in which 
we solve for the optimal combination of both variables. 
4.1. Optimal degree of information disclosure 
How is welfare affected by the degree of public information disclosure? And what is the 
interplay between the precision of information and the level of disclosure in terms of welfare 
effects? Expected welfare is given by  
     ( )( ) ( )
( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−= ∫
∈ 1,0
2,
i
i diaEaWE θθ  
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∫ ∫
=
−−−−+−=
P
i P
ii dixEdiyxE
0
1
22)1( θθγγ  
[ ] )()1()()1()( 22222 ii EPEEP εηγεγ −−−+−=  
( )
( )( ) ( ) ββα
αβ 11
1
1
2
2
P
rP
rPP −−−+
+−−= . 
Maximizing expected welfare with respect to 10 ≤≤ P  gives
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ += β
βα
r
P
3
,1min* . 
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The optimal degree of publicity *P  is smaller than one if, and only if 13/ −< rβα . This 
shows that it is better to disclose public information with a low precision only to a limited 
audience if coordination is a sufficiently strong motive. For r < 1/3, we always get the corner 
solution P* = 1. 
Conclusion 1: For all r ≥  1/3 (sufficiently strong strategic complementarity), the optimal 
degree of publicity ),(* βαP  is smaller than 1, if the private signal is sufficiently precise 
compared to the public signal. 
The intuition for such a result is that a partial disclosure of information can avoid over-
reaction to a signal, which is potentially far from the true state (when the public signal is 
imprecise). An imperfect degree of common information disclosure generates a mechanism in 
which the negative influence of agents’ over-reaction is outweighed by the positive impact of 
coordination on θ .  
For a better interpretation, we calculate the relative precision between the two types of 
signals, for which public information y should be disclosed with probability 1. The optimal 
degree of publicity is P* = 1 if ββα r3≥+ . Since 1≤r , βα 2≥  implies P* = 1. When the 
public signal is at least twice as precise as the private signal, public information should be 
disclosed to all agents with probability 1. On the other hand, if the private signal xi is 
extremely precise (so that β ∞→ ), or when the public signal y is extremely imprecise (so that 
α → 0), then it is optimal to disclose the public signal with a probability of 
})3/(1,1{min* rP → . 
In the limit, when α approaches zero, public information becomes worthless and will be 
disregarded even by those who receive it. Thus, for α =0, the degree of publicity is irrelevant. 
However, as soon as public signals have some content (α > 0), the optimal degree of publicity 
exceeds )3/(1 r  and increases with rising precision α.  
4.2. Optimal precision of information 
The impact of the precision of public information on expected welfare is 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )31
211
rP
rPrPPWE −+
−−+=∂
∂
βα
βα
α . 
Apparently,  
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( ) ( )1210)( −−≥⇔≥∂
∂ rPrPWE β
α
α . 
The sign of α∂∂ /EW  is ambiguous. If 2rP > 1 and private information is sufficiently precise, 
an increase in the precision of public information is detrimental to welfare. The case P = 1 
resembles M-S result according to which the precision of public information increases welfare 
if, and only if ( ) ( )121 −−≥ rrβα .  
If 12 <rP  or if private information is imprecise (small β ), then the precision of public 
information increases welfare. 
Conclusion 2: Increasing the precision of the public signal has positive welfare effects if 
the degree of publicity is sufficiently small. 
 
We also have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) 0
11
1
111
23
2
≥−+−+
−++−=∂
∂
ββα
βα
β PrP
rPrPrPPWE . 
This means that increasing the precision of private information is always a better policy.  
Conclusion 3: Increasing the precision of the private signal is always welfare increasing. 
If public information can be provided with infinite precision ( ∞→α ), then θ=y  almost 
certainly and full publication (P = 1) leads agents to choose yai = . Thereby, the expected 
welfare loss is zero, which is the first best solution.  
4.3. Second best optimum for a limited precision of public information 
Inevitable forecast errors limit the precision of public information, which is, after all, just the 
inverse variance between the public announcement and the ex-post realization of the 
fundamental state. M-S show that for P = 1, noisy public information can lead to a higher 
welfare loss than no public information at all: agents may prefer following a public signal, 
even of poor quality, because this enhances coordination. However due to the signal’s noise, 
the coordination point is likely to be distorted away from the efficient level θ . The public 
signal imposes an external effect: it directs all individuals who receive it towards the same 
action and, thereby, leads to a likely deviation of activities from θ. Such amplification of the 
initial noise is painful for all agents and damaging for welfare of the society as a whole. 
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If the principal has the option to choose the optimal degree of publicity P*, then the 
optimal precision is always maximal. To see this, compare P* with the condition for welfare 
increasing effects of public information precision. An increase in α  raises expected welfare if 
( ) ( )121 −−≥ rPrPβα . The optimal degree of publicity *P  is less than or equal to 
)3/()( ββα r+ , which is equivalent to ( )13 * −≥ rPβα . Since ( ) ( ) ( )12113 *** −−>− rPrPrP , 
we conclude that an increase in α  always raises expected welfare if the degree of public 
information is chosen optimally.  
Whenever the principal faces upper limits to the possible precision of public information, 
such that [ ]αα ,0∈ , then the second best solution is to provide public information with the 
highest possible precision α  and release it to a proportion )(* αP  of all agents. The optimal 
degree of publicity is smaller than 1 if α  is sufficiently small. Whenever α  is so small that 
M-S’s conclusion applies for P = 1, then )(* αP  < 1. But, even if α  is larger, as argued by 
Svensson (2005), the optimal degree of publicity may be less than one. 
As a consequence, we can state the main result of the paper: even if the precision of public 
information is restricted by someα , the central bank should provide public information with 
maximal (feasible) precision, but with some probability P that is below 1 if α  is sufficiently 
small.  
Main theorem: The second best optimal policy for [ ]αα ,0∈  is given by αα =*  and  
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ += β
βα
r
P
3
,1min* . 
We summarize these findings in Figure 1 (for r > ½). Solid curves represent social welfare 
contours in the (α,P)-space. Arrows indicate the direction of increasing welfare. The lower 
broken line is )(* αP . The upper broken curve indicates the set of points above which an 
increase in α  reduces welfare. Whenever )13( −< rβα , the optimal degree of publicity is 
smaller than one.  
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Figure 1 – Social welfare contours in (α,P)-space 
 
 
If the central bank cannot avoid that its announcements become common knowledge 
among all agents (P = 1) and cannot raise the public signal’s precision above some upper 
boundary, no information ( 0=α ) may be better than maximum precision (α ). M-S (p. 1529) 
conclude that “even if the choice of α entails no cost, we will see a “bang-bang” solution to 
the choice of optimal α in which the social optimum entails either providing no public 
information at all (…) or providing the maximum feasible amount of public information”. 
Such a (“bang-bang”) result does not hold anymore, once we relax the assumption that 
public signals are received by all agents with certainty. The tool of limiting the degree of 
publication allows for the exploitation of the positive feature of precise as possible public 
information: those who receive the public signal can improve their decisions, while 
withholding information entirely waives these profits for all agents.  
 
P*(α) 
P 
α = β (1-rP) (2rP-1) 
α  
Second best
α 
 1 
 0 
1/(3r) 
1/(2r) 
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5 – Policy Recommendations and Discussion 
We have shown that a central bank should rather limit the degree of publicity than the 
precision of information. To what extent can the central bank control the degree of publicity 
and by which means can it provide partially public information? Public information is a 
statement that is common knowledge. To achieve common knowledge, one might assemble 
all agents in one room and announce a statement or publish it in a medium that is common 
knowledge to be recognized by all agents. In practice, it seems more difficult to achieve 
common knowledge among all agents than amongst a smaller group. It may not be feasible to 
assemble all economic actors at the same time and, although all professional traders 
acknowledge the leading financial newspapers, they read these papers at different times. 
Hence, they can never be sure that everybody else has the same information.  
On the other hand, in coordination games it may be in the agents’ own interest to spread 
their information in order to move others’ actions towards their own. Hence, any 
announcement that is originally released to a limited audience may find its way to a wider 
public. An agent’s action may also be observable by others and reveal private or partially 
public information. Furthermore, if markets are efficient, any information that is shared by a 
positive mass of agents has a significant impact on the market and may be revealed by 
observable prices. Such propagation of information raises the degree of publicity above the 
original proportion of informed traders, and optimal information policy must account for these 
multiplier effects. 
In this section, we first suggest by which means a central bank can release information to a 
limited audience. Second, we discuss incentives and mechanisms by which private and 
partially public information may spread. Finally, we analyse whether a central bank might 
improve expected welfare by providing information to agents in private instead of publishing 
a common signal.  
5.1. Means for achieving limited publicity 
There are several means by which central banks release information. Most important are a 
central bank’s own publications (hardcopies and Internet), press releases, press conferences, 
speeches and interviews. The general practice is that publications and press releases are 
distributed as widely as possible to get through to all market participants. In addition, 
publication time is announced beforehand, so as to make sure that everybody has the chance 
for receiving new information at the same time. Speeches and interviews, instead, are directed 
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first of all to those who are physically present plus eventual listeners, if a speech is 
broadcasted. To reach a wider audience and avoid misinterpretation, the texts of important 
speeches are also disclosed and sometimes released via the Internet. For interviews, central 
banks invite journalists of leading financial newspapers to allow for the widest possible 
impact. None of these channels guarantees common knowledge, but there are clear attempts to 
achieve the highest possible degree of publicity.  
To strive for a more limited degree of publicity, central banks may  
(i) provide information to media that are known to be read by a limited audience, 
(ii) invite a limited number of journalists for providing new information, 
(iii) abstain from broadcasting or publishing speeches, 
(iv) communicate with a small number of banks, 
(v) hide information in the Internet,  
(vi) disclose information at irregular times, 
(vii) release information that can be interpreted only by a fraction of speculators.  
Launching information in selected media may be a very efficient way of controlling the 
degree of publicity. Circulation of newspapers is well documented and may serve as a 
measure for the number of recipients. At least at the IMF, it is common practice to release 
information to a small number of journalists from selected media. Speeches may also be a 
very effective tool for achieving partial publicity, because attention to speeches is limited in 
comparison to written information. Walsh (2005, pp. 3-4) argues that: “Partial 
announcements can occur when, for example, central bankers make speeches about the 
economy that may not be as widely reported as formal announcements would be. Speeches 
and other means of providing partial information play an important role in the practice of 
central bankers, and these means of communication long predated publication of inflation 
reports. Speeches, like academic conferences, can be viewed as one means of providing 
information to only a limited subset of the public.” As any other important information, a 
speech is covered by media afterwards, which increases publicity. These multiplier effects 
must be considered. However, as will be argued in more detail below, private dissemination 
of information is less likely generating common knowledge than a direct publication by the 
central bank.  
Central banks seem to disclose some information strategically. For example, central banks 
often communicate with a small number of banks who thus receive more information than 
others. For the purpose of limiting publicity, it may help not to announce such meetings or the 
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identity of receivers of information to the public either. The timing of announcements is also 
chosen deliberately. Imagine that the Bank of England makes an announcement during 
daytime in Europe. Traders may trade in Europe. But, by the time some other stock markets 
open, prices may have integrated the information and it may be too late for speculators from 
other areas to trade. Announcements tend to be public in the geographic area where they are 
released and are, thus, directed at a subgroup of traders in global markets.  
Information that is provided via the Internet is, in principle, publicly available. Depending 
on the transparency of a website, information can be attained more or less easily. The more 
difficult it is to find certain data, the less likely will they be found by any particular agent. 
Even if some trader finds information of general interest that is hidden in the depth of a 
central bank’s website, his subjective probability for another person finding the same 
information will be lower than for information that is reported on the entry page. This lower 
probability is all that is required for avoiding damaging effects of higher-order beliefs.    
Releasing information at irregular times may not prevent that everybody receives the 
information eventually. But, if publication time is not common knowledge, the information 
cannot become common knowledge at any point in time either. The same argument applies to 
private dissemination of information. Although multiplier effects cannot be avoided, 
secondary distribution of information is less predictable and is likely to have lower effects on 
higher-order beliefs than primary information. As long as there is no common knowledge 
about the process, by which private agents spread information, the information cannot become 
common knowledge either. 
Under certain conditions, it may be possible to release signals that can only be interpreted 
in combination with ex-ante information under the disposal of a limited fraction of market 
participants. In these cases a public release of the signal amounts to limited publicity. 
Ambiguous statements do, in general, not yield this effect. With different ex-ante information, 
an ambiguous statement amounts to an imprecise signal for traders with low ex-ante 
information. Our results show, however, that imprecise signals should not be released to a 
general audience. Hence, ambiguity works only, if there is a clear distinction between agents, 
for whom the ambiguity is resolved, once they combine the statement with their ex-ante 
information, and agents who have no use at all for the ambiguous signal. 
Far from being perfect, all these means of communication should allow the central bank to 
provide partially public information when the quality of this information is for some reason 
poor (e.g. forecast errors). Another issue is how the observation by traders of prices and 
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others’ action might impede the central bank’s goal to achieve limited publicity. In a rational 
expectations equilibrium, markets may integrate private and partially public information such 
that this information is revealed by the price system. In a fully revealing equilibrium, all 
information is common knowledge. We think of such an equilibrium as the outcome of a 
process during which traders move prices. The actions are carried out before the equilibrium 
is established and a revealing price system can be observed. During this process, it is an 
advantage to predict the average opinion better than others. Once information is integrated 
and the price system is settled, there are no gains from speculation anymore. Full revelation 
requires that all actions have been carried out. Keynes’ beauty contest example is meant to 
represent the behaviour of professional traders who try to make money from speculation 
during price adjustments. They cannot use information that is revealed only after prices adjust 
to their actions.  
Experimental evidence on herding games, like Kübler and Weizsäcker (2003), indicate that 
subjects do not fully deduce information from observable actions. In their experiment, 
subjects had to decide between two actions and could buy some noisy signal containing 
information about which choice is likely to be the better one. In equilibrium, the first subject 
would buy this information and reveal it by her decision, while the others would follow the 
first player’s choice, because they can deduce her information from her decision. Actual 
behaviour, instead, is consistent with a model in which most subjects rationally integrate 
original signals and take into account that most others respond rationally to original signals. 
However, they hardly account for higher-order beliefs arising from the consideration that 
other players do also account for others’ rationality. The experiment demonstrates that 
observing private agents’ actions is no substitute for official information. In addition, 
Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004) and Cornand (2005) present experiments on 
coordination games with private and public information. Contrary to theoretical predictions, 
they find only small differences in behaviour in response to the mode of information. Other 
publications in experimental economics3 also support the view that common information does 
not necessarily induce common knowledge. 
The practical means, by which the effects on higher-order beliefs can be separated from the 
provision of information, are not fully understood yet. There may be even better ways to 
release information, but to a limited audience, if higher-order beliefs could be managed 
separately. The best mode of information provision would be a full release of the public signal 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Smith (1991) and Nagel (1995). 
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to everybody, as long as each player believes that he is the only one, who gets the signal. 
However, this seems impossible and partial publicity is a compromise – a second-best 
solution given the restraints on mechanisms for providing information. 
5.2. Private provision of public information and information diffusion 
Agents may be able to disseminate a partially public signal to a wider audience by sharing 
information with other agents. This might make it difficult for the central bank to limit the 
degree of publicity. Lack of credibility or of common knowledge about the dissemination 
process may prevent common knowledge of privately provided public signals. There are good 
reasons to believe that privately provided information is less likely to become common 
knowledge than official information provided by the central bank. 
However, agents may not even be interested in spreading the partially public signal. 
Raising the degree of publicity has positive and negative effects on an agent’s expected 
payoff. By raising P, more agents receive signal y and all agents receiving this signal increase 
the weight γ−1  that they put on this signal. This improves coordination with other informed 
agents. But, other informed agents can improve their coordination as well. An agent’s utility 
depends on the difference between his own coordination failure and the average coordination 
failure of others. This reflects the zero-sum game in Keynes’ beauty contest: an investor gains 
from predicting the average opinion better than other agents. An agent who spreads a partially 
public signal y weakens his competitive advantage. In addition, for higher P, the agent will 
put a larger weight on y, so that his action is further away from his expected realization of the 
fundamental state θ. This hurts the goal of meeting fundamentals. Together, the larger 
distortion of one’s action from expected fundamentals and the competition effect may 
outweigh the coordination advantage associated with spreading one’s information.  
The net effect of P on the expected payoff (ex post, conditional on receiving the public 
signal) is ambiguous. Simulations4 indicate that conditional expected payoff is decreasing in P 
for all ≥P P*  if the partially public signal is more precise than private information ( βα > ) 
or if r < 2/3. We found that an increase in P  raises an informed agent’s expected utility only 
if the precision of private signals is higher than the precision of the public signal, the 
coordination motive is sufficiently strong and, in addition, the agent’s private signal is far 
away from the public signal, that is, || yxi −  is large compared to standard deviations of 
                                                 
4 Simulations are available at http://www.sfm.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/heinemann/publics/optimal-publicity.html.   
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signals. Only then, an agent may have an incentive to increase the degree of publicity of 
signal y  beyond P*.  
But, no agent would want to fully disseminate the signal to the whole population. In 
Appendix B, we show that a marginal increase in the degree of publicity unambiguously 
reduces an informed agent’s expected utility if P is close to 1. That is,  
0
),|(
1
<
→P
ii
Pd
yxuEd
     for all β,r  with 1),(* <βrP  and for all yxi , . 
This result indicates that no agent who receives the public signal is interested in full publicity 
by spreading the signal to everybody. Simulations do also indicate that the posterior expected 
utility for an informed agent, given *P , is always higher than the posterior utility for 1=P . 
Thus, if informed agents can only choose between full publicity and not spreading 
information at all, they would abstain from disseminating the partially public signal.   
If there are agents who expect profiting from an increase in P, their private and public 
signals differ considerably. These agents have conflicting interests. Meeting the fundamental 
requires an action close to ),|( yxE iθ . The beauty contest calls for deviating towards y. The 
trade-off is affected by P, because a higher degree of publicity increases gains from deviating 
towards y. When such an agent spreads the public signal, he attributes a larger weight to this 
signal in his own action, due to the coordination motive. Thereby, his action deviates even 
further from the expected fundamental. The additional losses from meeting the fundamental 
must be over-compensated by expected gains from competing in the beauty contest. The 
agents’ incentive to spreading information comes from expected gains that arise when 
previously uninformed agents choose actions that are closer to his own. If he could choose, 
which information to provide, he would not spread the true public signal, but rather pretend 
that the public signal is identical with his action, thus, a linear combination of the true signal y 
and his private signal xi. That is, he has an incentive to misrepresent the public signal instead 
of truthfully sharing it with others. This should be expected by those who receive public 
signals from private sources. However, these receivers do not know, in which direction the 
signal is distorted, because xi is private information. Accounting for the incentives to 
misrepresent a public signal, amounts to a lower precision of the privately provided public 
signal. Privately provided signals are not as credible as information provided by the central 
bank. Lack of credibility, however, prevents that other agents put the same weight on such 
signals as on official information. Thus, there is a crucial difference between official signals 
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and those provided by private agents: the latter may always be biased and, therefore, appear 
less credible. This limits the capacity of private agents to spread partially public information 
and raise the degree of publicity too far beyond the original *P . 
If we follow Svensson (2005), realism requires assuming that the partially public signal is 
more precise than private information ( βα > ). In this case, agents who can be sure to receive 
the partially public signal are interested in a degree of publicity that is lower than socially 
optimal. If they could alter the degree of publicity, they would rather reduce than increase it. 
Therefore, we may expect that insiders, like private banks with close ties to the central bank, 
might try to convince the central bank to limit public disclosures at a level below P*.  
5.3. Central bank’s provision of private information 
Instead of releasing a common signal, the central bank might want to release information to 
agents in private. Within a speculative-attack game, Heinemann and Illing (2002) suggest that 
the central bank should release information to each agent privately with some idiosyncratic 
noise, thereby avoiding common knowledge. In their speculative-attack game, private 
information has the advantage of preventing multiple equilibria that may be interpreted as 
potential currency crises out of self-fulfilling beliefs.  
Does such a mechanism improve expected welfare in our beauty-contest game and would 
it be optimal to release these idiosyncratic signals to all agents in the economy? To answer 
this question, suppose that the central bank, instead of releasing her own information y, gives 
a fraction P of all agents an official signal ii yy ν+= , where random terms iν  are i.i.d. with 
variance 2νσ . For 02 →νσ , official signals are almost as precise as the common signal y in the 
reference model. They help informed agents to predict fundamentals, which is welfare 
enhancing. However, official signals are very close to each other and, thereby, serve as focal 
points for coordinating activities almost as much as in the reference model with a common 
official signal. Idiosyncratic official signals are distributed around the central bank’s 
information. If this information is noisy (small α ), official signals may distort informed 
agent’s actions away from their expected fundamentals, which was the cause for the 
detrimental welfare effect in the reference model. Idiosyncratic official signals have about the 
same effect as a common signal, if the correlation of official signals is common knowledge. 
The equilibrium weight on these signals is somewhat smaller than on a common signal (due to 
the additional noise) and it rises in P as in the reference case. Thereby, allowing the 
possibility of providing idiosyncratic official signals instead of a common signal does not 
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alter the main result that these signals should be provided to some fraction of the population 
close to P*. And they should be as precise as possible, bringing us back to a common signal.  
The discontinuity of the equilibrium manifold, known from speculative-attack games, does 
not apply to the beauty-contest framework with its unique equilibrium. Not common 
knowledge of the signal per se is responsible for the suboptimal high weight that agents 
attribute to it. The detrimental welfare effects also arise if official signals are private but 
distributed around imprecise central bank information, provided that the correlation of private 
signals is common knowledge.   
 
6 - Conclusion 
Our paper contributes to an ongoing debate about the desirability of increased transparency. 
In financial markets, speculators gain from predicting the average opinion better than others. 
Thus, agents not only have an interest in responding to the underlying fundamentals but also 
have a coordination motive to take similar actions. Their actions represent strategic 
complements. Nevertheless, at the social level, effective market coordination per se is not 
socially valuable. Efficiency requires that the price system reflects market fundamentals and 
the central bank aims at driving agents’ actions as close as possible to these fundamentals. In 
this context, the strong focal potential exerted by public information can be welfare damaging 
because it induces overreactions, if public signals lack precision.  
This paper distinguishes two dimensions of information disclosure policy: precision of 
signals and degree of publicity. Both instruments interact. We have shown that in a context 
where the central bank makes inevitable forecast errors, it is efficient to provide public 
information with highest possible precision to only a fraction of market participants. The 
optimal degree of publicity is rising in the precision of signals. If public signals can be 
released with a precision that is at least twice the precision of private information, public 
signals should be released to all traders.  
The intuition behind these results is the following: A public signal serves as focal point for 
traders in predicting other’s actions. They attach a larger weight to these signals than justified 
by their informational content. Thereby, traders’ actions are heavily influenced by public 
information. If this information is imprecise, agents coordinate with a large probability on a 
state that differs substantially from fundamentals. This reduces ex-ante expected welfare. 
However, all information is valuable to the extent that it helps predicting the state of the 
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world. A limited degree of publicity reduces incentives to exaggerate the weight on public 
signals. Thereby, limiting publicity combines the positive effects of valuable information for 
those who get it with a confinement of its threats by limiting the number of receivers. The 
higher the precision of public signals, the lower is the probability that an exaggerated weight 
reduces welfare. Hence, the optimal degree of publicity is rising to one if public signals are 
sufficiently more precise than private information.  
Publishing information in selected media, speeches, conferences, interviews, and meetings 
with representatives of selected financial institutions are effective means of providing 
partially public information. These means play an important role in the actual policy of central 
banks already. Central banks seem to disclose information strategically in communicating 
with a small number of banks and to deliberately choose the timing of announcements. 
Thereby, our results give a rationale for the common practice of central banks to release 
partially public information in addition to official publications. Our main result shows that 
these means of partial publicity should only be employed for announcements of low precision. 
While agents may be able to disseminate a partially public signal to a wider audience, we 
have shown that this is, in general, not in their interest, because spreading their information 
reduces their competitive advantage in predicting average opinion better than others. If an 
agent can expect to profit from sharing his information with others, he has an incentive to 
misrepresent the partially public signal. Thus, privately provided public signals are less 
credible than official information and exert a smaller effect on coordinating actions.  
Nevertheless, there are some obvious implementation problems to our policy advice. Even 
though it is already in central banks’ practice to partially disclose information, the issue of the 
determination of the actual degree of publicity – including estimates of multiplier effects that 
are generated by media coverage and private dissemination of signals – needs to be addressed. 
Laboratory experiments indicate that common signals do not generate all of the higher-order 
beliefs that are so detrimental to our model economy. It is an open question whether and how 
mechanisms of providing information can separately affect real traders’ beliefs about the state 
of the world and higher-order beliefs about others’ expectations. A rigorous experimental 
analysis of this question might be useful for designing optimal mechanisms of disseminating 
information to financial markets. 
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Appendix A 
In Section 3 we claimed that an equilibrium strategy is a linear combination of the available 
signals. Otherwise, there might be multiple equilibria. Linearity can be proven along the lines 
suggested by Morris and Shin (2002). The optimal action of agent i is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )aErEra iii +−= θ1 . 
For agents who receive just a private signal, ii xa = . For the others, the optimal strategy 
depends on both signals and is denoted by ],[),( yxyxa iiip ∈ . The average activity is given 
by 
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where ),( ya p θ  is the average action of informed agents. Hence,  
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)(θkpE denotes the average expectation of the average expectation … (k-times) of θ , and 
)(aE
k
p  is the average expectation of the average expectation … of the average action, where 
all averages concern informed agents only. For 1<rP , the limes term is zero. Morris and 
Shin (2002) have shown that ))(( θkpi EE  is a linear combination of xi and y. Hence, ),( yxa iip  
is also a linear combination of xi and y.         QED 
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Here, we prove our claim from Section 5.2 that for 1→P , 
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Recall that for an informed agent ( ) yxa ii γγ −+= 1 , while jj xa =  for an agent who does 
not receive the partially public signal. Furthermore, iix εθ +=  and ηθ +=y . The payoff for 
agent i is 
( ) ( )1 1 12 22
0 0 0
(1 ) ( )i i j i j ku r a r a a dj r a a dj dkθ= − − − − − + −∫ ∫ ∫ . 
Using the equations above, ηγεγθ )1( −+=− iia . Without loss of generality, we assume 
that agents ],0[ Pj ∈  receive the public signal and ( ,1]j P∈  are not informed. Then, 
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Inserting these terms, the payoff of an informed agent is 
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Up to now, we did not normalize units of account. To ease calculations, we use this degree of 
freedom here and normalize .1=+ βα  Expectations of agent i conditional on his information 
are denoted by Ei. Using the rules for conditional expectations of normally distributed 
variables and the above normalization, we get 
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Agent i’s conditional expected payoff is now given by 
[ ] [ ]βεγηγηεγγεγ /1)()()1()()1(2)()1()( 222222 +−−+−+−−= iiiiiiiii EPrEEEruE  
   [ ]βηγηεγγεγ /1)()1()()1(2)()1( 2222 +−+−+−− iiiii EEEPr  
   [ ] ββηγβγβγ /)1(2/1)()1(/)1(2/2 222222 PrEPPrPr i −++−+−++  
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Taking the derivative of the expected payoff with respect to P and rearranging terms yields 
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and 'γ  denotes the derivative of the weight on the private signal to P. With a continuum of 
agents, there will be agents with any value for yxi −  almost certainly. To ensure that no 
agent has an incentive to raise the degree of publicity, 'A  and 'B  must be negative. Using 
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β
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−−= , we can check the signs of these terms by calculating 
them for a fine grid of parameter values. It turns out that 0' <A  for all )1,0(,, ∈Prβ . 
Function 'B  is increasing in β  and r and decreasing in P. If 2/1<β  or 3/2<r , 'B  is 
negative for all *PP ≥ . For all β  and r, 'B  becomes negative if 1→P .    QED 
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